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two-country Cournot model, where ﬁrms enter new markets via greenﬁeld FDI or acqui-
sition. The model takes into account both technological and market size asymmetries, and 
allows for M&A transaction costs, like corporate ﬁnance and legal fees. We show that to 
be the acquirer, a ﬁrm from a small country needs not only a strong technological lead but 
also the ability to exploit it on a global scale, which requires low international technolo-
gy transfer costs. Moreover, we ﬁnd that a multilateral greenﬁeld investment liberalization 
may actually increase the incentives for foreign acquisitions. The effect of such liberaliza-
tion on the nationality of the acquirer depends largely on the extent of the technology gap.
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WHO BUYS WHOM IN INTERNATIONAL OLIGOPOLIES WITH FDI AND 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER? 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The internationalisation of firms has assumed two new features. First, firms increasingly enter foreign 
markets by acquiring a local producer rather than through greenfield FDI. The pattern is particularly 
pronounced in industrialized host countries. Acquisitions accounted for 90% of inward FDI in the US1 in 
1998 (UNCTAD (2000)). Most of such investments are directed towards the service sector, not 
manufacturing, as in the past. In fact, while in the early 1970s services accounted for only one quarter of 
the world FDI stock, this share had risen to about 60% in 2002 (UNCTAD (2004)). Out of 35.000 M&As 
registered by Thomson Financial during the period 1995 to 2005, more than half were found in the 
service sectors. Second, the interaction between the international strategy and the innovative activity of 
firms has become increasingly tight and complex, due to the key role of multinational companies 
(MNEs) in the process of generating and transferring technology and knowledge in the global market. 
Models should therefore capture the technological implications of cross-border acquisitions. 
The theoretical literature in economics has not devoted much focus to these important trends. 
Most of the formal modelling of the internationalization of firms is still devoted to explain the drivers 
and effects of greenfield FDI in the manufacturing sector (Horstmann and Markusen (1992); Petit and 
Sanna-Randaccio (2000); Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004); Grünfeld (2006)). Such models cannot 
help analyzing these recent trends for several reasons. To start with, as opposed to manufactured 
products, most services are not tradable, thus the traditional way in which these models are framed (the 
choice between export and FDI) cannot be applied to the internationalization of service. Second, while 
greenfield FDI is considered, foreign entry via acquisition is not accounted for. As a consequence, what 
is now the bulk of FDI activity remains unexplored. 
Foreign acquisitions are often subject to intense public debate, especially if the takeover is 
directed towards service sectors, where foreign ownership traditionally has been less pronounced (e.g 
utilities and local transportation). During the last decades, a large number of technologically advanced 
firms in smaller industrialized economies have been acquired by firms with larger home markets like the 
US and UK. Many of these acquired firms were technology leaders and could, under the right conditions, 
expand internationally on their own through greenfield investment or acquisitions abroad. However there 
is also a fair amount of examples of advanced service sector firms from small markets expanding in 
larger foreign markets through acquisitions. For instance, Belgian KBC bank acquired the relatively large 
UK based financial firm Peel Hunt in 2001, the Austrian based advertising firm Lowe Lintas GGK 
bought the British advertising firm Broadway Group one year earlier, while Danish Group 4 Falch 
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acquired French based Euroguard. According to Thomson Financial M&A database, more than 350 
acquisitions in the service sectors involved a small country acquirer and a large country target during the 
last 5 years.        
In this paper, we identify the optimal foreign entry mode in a two country, two firm Cournot 
model with asymmetric firm technology levels and asymmetric market (country) sizes. We are 
particularly concerned with such asymmetries because the size of a market may affect the decision on 
how to enter it. And moreover, the relative technological level of a firm also contributes to determine the 
profitability of entering foreign markets. We specifically ask in which setting a technological leader from 
a small country finds it optimal to buy a technologically inferior firm from a large country and vice-
versa. To answer this question, we develop a model that identifies the acquirer and the target firm. To our 
knowledge, and somewhat surprisingly, there exists no such model which is applied to issues on 
international M&As.  Moreover, as opposed to the majority of earlier theoretical models on international 
M&As, we explicitly allow for FDI running both ways between countries. This is a desirable property in 
the case of industrialised countries, where multinationals often compete in each other’s home markets. 
In the first stage of the model, firms simultaneously choose between no entry, greenfield FDI or 
acquisition of the other firm. Notice that the model does not include exports as a strategic option. Thus, it 
is best suited for studies of foreign entry into service sectors or manufacturing sectors where there are 
high fixed and low variable export costs. In the second stage, firms set the profit maximizing level of 
output. If a firm enters the foreign market through greenfield FDI, it has to pay a fixed investment cost 
and its technology level in the foreign market is reduced due to technology transfer costs. If a firm enters 
through acquisition, it must offer the other firm a sufficiently high acquisition price in order to obtain an 
acceptance. If the bid is accepted through a Nash bargaining process, the acquirer becomes a monopolist 
in both markets. The model is novel in this respect, as it combines a non-cooperative game relating to the 
greenfield FDI decision, with a cooperative bargaining game where the potential acquisition and the 
identity of the equilibrium acquirer is established.   
If an acquisition takes place, the global monopolist may gain from three effects: a larger 
monopoly rent, a best practice effect as better technology can be utilized in both countries, and finally 
saving fixed plant costs associated with greenfield FDI. The model also captures that additional costs are 
associated with the acquisition, e.g. due to legal and corporate finance fees.  
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we briefly survey the relevant literature on this 
subject and clarify what distinguishes our model from previous studies. Section 3 presents the model. 
Section 4 analyzes the non-cooperative constrained game with a strategy space that excludes acquisition. 
Section 5 analyses the acquisition decision in a cooperative game framework, by applying the Nash fixed 
threat bargaining model. In Section 6, we analyse the equilibrium outcomes in the full model, partly 
                                                 
1 The figure refers to M&A however the same source indicates that acquisition dominates the scene, since less than 
3% of cross-border acquisitions by number are mergers (UNCTAD (2000) p. 99). 
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based on analytical results and partly on numerical simulations. Finally, Section 7 presents the main 
conclusions. 
 
2. Earlier empirical and theoretical contributions 
 
Numerous empirical studies, mainly undertaken in the 1990s, have analyzed the MNEs choice between 
greenfield FDI and acquisition. The technological characteristics of the foreign investor emerge as an 
important determinant of the entry mode. The R&D intensity of the investing firm appears to be 
negatively related to the probability of an acquisition as compared to a greenfield FDI (Andersson and 
Svensson (1994); Brouthres and Brouthres (2000); Harzing  (2002)). This finding is explained as the 
result of two factors. First, greenfield entry reduces the chance of technology dissemination in the foreign 
country. Second, it may be more difficult to exploit abroad a superior technology implanting it in an 
existing organisation than by creating a new one.  The results are more mixed with respect to the impact 
of the relative technological capability of the investor, versus the target firm.  Kogut and Chang (1991) 
analysed Japanese investments in the US at the industry level and found that Japanese acquisitions in the 
US are insensitive to the difference in R&D expenditure in Japan and the US.2 On the other hand, Anand 
and Delios (2002), considering 2175 entries by British, German and Japanese investors in the US, found  
that the  probability of entry via acquisition was positively affected by the difference in R&D 
expenditure in the host and home country, indicating acquisitions motivated by  technology sourcing.  
As to the effect of home and host country characteristics, there is substantial agreement that the 
cultural distance between home and host country decreases the probability of entry via acquisition as it 
increases the cost of integrating the two company cultures (Kogut and Singh (1988); Barkema and 
Vermeulen (1998); Harzing (2002)). However there is no concordance on other aspects. For instance, the 
level of GDP per capita in the host economy is found to be positively and significantly related to the 
probability of acquisition (Andersson and Svensson (1994)), but has a negative (although not significant) 
effect in Barkema and Vermeulen (1998). Nor the size of the host country bears any clear impact. 
Furthermore, mixed evidence is obtained on the influence of other factors such as foreign experience and 
the degree of product diversification of the investor3.  
The economic mechanisms associated with international acquisitions are clearly not yet fully 
explained by the empirical literature, thus theoretical work may help to stimulate new directions for 
empirical research.  
Recently, a few theoretical papers have addressed the issue of Greenfield FDI via cross border 
acquisition, but in these studies the identity of the acquirer is exogenously determined and the interplay 
between asymmetries in the technology level of firms and the relative size of countries is not accounted 
                                                 
2 Similar results obtained by Anand and Kogut (1997) 
3 As to the effect of foreign experience on the probability of  foreing entry via acquisition or greenfield, Andersson and 
Svensson (1994) found a positive effetc; Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) and Brouthers and Brouthers (2000), found a 
negative effect and in Hennart and Park (1993) and Kogut and Singh (1988)  this variable was not significant.   
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for. Moreover in most of these studies the acquisition has no effect on the profitability of the foreign 
investor in the home country, and technology flows only from the foreign firm to the local ones, thus 
excluding  the possibility of technology sourcing FDI.  Interesting insights may nevertheless be drawn 
from this literature.4  
These analyses predominantly assume only one way FDI. Mattoo, Olarreaga and Saggi (2004) 
present a North-South model which highlights how the foreign firm’s choice between greenfield FDI or 
acquisition and the local government’s ranking of the two modes are affected by the cost of technology 
transfer within the MNE.  Focusing on developed countries, Bjorvatn (2004) studies the effect of 
economic integration on the profitability of international merger with two countries and three firms. Two 
producers are located in a foreign country and are “active” as they decide how to expand abroad via 
export, greenfield investment or acquisition, the third one in the national market is set to be the potential 
acquisition target. The model shows that economic integration may stimulate international mergers by 
lowering the reservation price of the target firm and by reducing the business stealing effect5, since the 
outside firm (the “active” non merging firm) is more likely to choose export instead of greenfield FDI. 
The impact that greenfield FDI barriers may have on the likelihood of an acquisition is analyzed also by 
Norbäck and (2002). They consider the case in which a state-owned firm is privatized and sold in an 
auction in which a local privately owned firm and a foreign MNE compete as buyers.  The foreign firm 
may enter the market via export, greenfield FDI or acquiring the privatized firm. The paper suggests that 
high greenfield costs and high trade costs do not necessarily induce foreign acquisitions in privatization, 
since the domestic firm can more easily prevent the foreign firm from becoming a strong local 
competitor. Hence the willingness to pay of the domestic firm for the state assets is high.6  The 
importance of entry threats by greenfield FDI and/or export is also highlighted be Eicher and Kang 
(2005). Their three stage entry model based on Bertrand’s conjectures shows that very large markets are 
likely to attract acquisitions due to large monopoly benefits, when  entry threats by  greenfield FDI 
and/or export can be used.  
Only a few studies consider two-way FDI, and the studies are framed in a symmetric context, 
where the identity of the acquirer is undetermined. Horn and Persson (2001) analyze how the incentive to 
form either domestic or international mergers is influenced by trade costs. They consider the choice 
whether to export abroad or to acquire a foreign firm in a symmetric model with four firms. Greenfield 
                                                 
4 Recently, models based on new trade theory and firm heterogeneity have advanced further to explain the choice 
between export, Greenfield FDI and acquisition in foreign markets. See Nocke and Yeaple (2005) for more on this.  
5 This effect is due to firms not participating to the merger expanding their production and therefore stealing business 
from merging partners. 
6 See also Görg (2000). He analyses whether a technologically advantaged firm, which has decided to undertake an FDI 
in a foreign market, will enter via greenfield investment or acquisition, and in the latter case whether  to acquire the 
local  low technology or the high technology firm. The analysis shows that under most conditions the take-over of the 
existing indigenous high technology firm is the preferred market entry mode. 
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FDI is not allowed for, thus making the model less relevant for most service sectors. They find that high 
trade barriers induce domestic rather than international mergers contrary to the tariff jumping argument.7  
Several important questions thus remain unanswered: how to determine endogenously the 
identity of the acquirer; what are the roles of technological and country size asymmetries and what is the 
effect of greenfield FDI liberalisation and ICT improvements on the equilibrium mode of entry.   
 
3. The model 
 
The model consists of two countries (I and II) and two firms, (1 and 2), that produce a homogeneous 
service or good in country I and II respectively. Countries may vary in size and firms may differ as to 
cost reducing exogenous technology as in Fosfuri and Motta (1999).8 Firms determine the mode of 
foreign entry, choosing among three possible strategies: no expansion abroad (N), greenfield FDI (G) or 
full acquisition9 of the foreign firm (Ai), i=1,2 where i represents the acquirer.  
We assume that the total technology pool is divided between the two firms in proportion σ  for 
firm 1 and ( σ−1 ) for firm 2 with [ ]1,0∈σ .  Unit variable costs in the home market for firm 1 and 2, 
respectively under the strategies N and G, are simply: 
σ−= 0,1 cc I                                                                                                                                   (1)           
)1(0,2 σ−−= cc II                                                                                                                          (2) 
where the parameter 10 ≥c  guarantees non-negative costs. We assume that there is no involuntary 
dissemination of knowledge (no external spillovers) when the two firms are under separate ownership.10 
The unit variable costs of production abroad under G are given by: 
τσ−= 0,1 cc II                                                                                                                                 (3) 
)1(0,2 στ −−= cc I                                                                                                                         (4)                 
showing that cross border internal know how transfer from parent to subsidiary is costly. The costs of 
internal knowledge transfer are inversely related to the parameter [ ]1,0∈τ . It follows that if 1<τ , the 
subsidiary is always less efficient than its parent. If a firm chooses G, it also faces a fixed set up cost F in 
the foreign market.       
If firm 1 makes the acquisition, unit variable production cost in country I and II respectively are: 
                                                 
7 Ferret (2003) analyses cross border acquisitions in an international duopoly with a third potential player deciding on 
entry. The model shows that acquisitions are more likely in medium sized markets where entry does not occur (thus 
implying that with the growth of the world economy acquisitions will tend to slow). 
8 Fosfuri and Motta (1999) present a Cournot duopoly model where firms may choose to service the foreign market 
either through exports or greenfield FDI. We bring this model one step further, by allowing firms to enter the foreign 
market through an acquisition.   
9 Here we  do not allow firms to involve in a merger where the parties own a percentage share of the firm. Such a 
possibility will complicate the model since we both will have to specify merger price and a sharing rate of profits 
between parties. Mattoo et al. (2004) also show that the equilibrium M&A always is a 100% acquisition. 
10 This is a strong assumption that simplifies the model vastly. Yet since we operate with technology transfer when 
acquisition is the strategy, allowing for no transfer under G, can simply be viewed as a relative benchmarking of the 
technology transfer under different entry modes.  
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 { }[ ])1(,max0,1 στσ −−= cc I                                                                                                       (5) 
{ }[ ])1(,max0,1 στσ −−= cc II                                                                                                        (6) 
while if firm 2 makes the acquisition we have:  
{ }[ ]τσσ ),1(max0,2 −−= cc II                                                                                                       (7) 
{ }[ ])1(,max0,2 στσ −−= cc I                                                                                                        (8) 
Equations (5)-(8) rest on the assumption of a best practise effect (the term in the square brackets). That is 
to say, we assume that the new company adopts in each market what is the most efficient technology 
between that available in-house and that available in the target company. However, if foreign technology 
is implemented in a firm, there will be a loss due to technology transfer costs. An acquisition also 
requires additional acquisition transaction costs which will be discussed in section 5.1. 
We assume linear (inverse) demand functions:  
IIII Qasqqp −=+ )( ,2,1                                                                                                                 (9) 
IIIIIIII Qsaqqp −−=+ )1()( ,2,1                                                                                                    (10) 
where JJJ qqQ ,2,1 +=  for J=I,II. The parameter a represents the joint size of the two markets while the 
parameter )1,0(∈s indicates the share of a accounted for by country I, and (1-s) the share by country II. 
The profits of the two firms differ depending on the strategy combinations ),( 21 λλ  with 
{ }AiGNii ,,=Λ∈λ . Six equilibrium strategies may arise: )(NN  where each firm produce and sell 
only in the home market; )(GN  ( )(NG ) where firm 1 (2) conducts a greenfield FDI while the rival 
operates only in the domestic market; )(GG where we have a MNE duopoly; )0,1(A where firm 1 
acquires firm 2, and finally )2,0( A where firm 2 acquires firm 1.  The profit functions are reported in 
Appendix I. 
We identify the optimal foreign entry mode by solving a two stage game. In the first stage, firms 
decide upon the mode of entry. This is done in two steps. We first find the non-cooperative solution to a 
constrained game with strategy space { }GNi ,~ =Λ  ignoring acquisition as a strategy. We call this the 
status quo game. The solution to this game defines the threat point (alternative profits if no agreement) 
in the cooperative acquisition game, where we identify whether there will be an acquisition and who 
buys whom. The cooperative game is solved using the Nash fixed-threat bargaining equilibrium concept. 
In the second stage, firms set their profit maximizing level of output. As usual, the game is solved by 
backwards induction.  
 
4. The status quo game 
 
We first describe the non-cooperative status quo game with the constrained strategy space { }GNi ,~ =Λ . 
Firm specific equilibrium profit functions for the four possible strategy combinations are reported in 
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Appendix II. By comparing equilibrium profits under alternative strategy combinations, we can identify 
the condition for a dominant strategy: 
[ ]
F
cas >−−+−−
9
)1(2)1( 20 στσ                                                                                             (11) 
[ ]
F
csa >−−+−
9
)1(2 20 σστ                                                                                                     (12) 
If (11) is satisfied, G is the dominant strategy for firm 1. Otherwise, N will be the dominant 
strategy.11 Similarly, if (12) holds, G will be the dominant strategy for firm 2.12 The probability that (11) 
(alternatively(12)) holds is decreasing (increasing) in s (the relative size of market I): 
 
[ ]
0
9
)1(2)1(2)11( 0 <−−+−−−=∂
∂ στσcasa
s
LHS                                                                     (13) 
 
[ ]
0
9
)1(22)12( 0 >−−+−=∂
∂ σστcsaa
s
LHS                                                                               (14) 
This finding reminds us that a large host market (ceteris paribus) is an important attractor for inward 
greenfield FDI since it implies higher variable profits, to compensate for the additional fixed plant costs 
(F).  Similarly, a larger total market (a) gives stronger incentives for greenfield FDI. 
The probability that (11) (alternatively(12)) holds is increasing (decreasing) inσ  (the relative 
technology level of firm 1): 
 
[ ]
0
9
)1(2)1(2
)12()11( 0 >−−+−−+=∂
∂ στστσ
casLHS                                                              (15) 
 
[ ]
0
9
)1(22
)12()12( 0 <−−+−+−=∂
∂ σσττσ
csaLHS                                                                   (16) 
 
So the technologically leading firm is more likely to expand abroad than the weaker competitor. Its 
variable cost advantage implies that by producing abroad it will enjoy –ceteris paribus- higher variable 
profits than its competitor. The advantage of the leading firm is greater the lower the cost of cross border 
technology transfer (the higherτ ) since low internal technology transfer costs imply that the leading firm 
will benefit more in the foreign market from its technological leadership.   
 
                                                 
11 If (11) holds, we have that: NGGG 11 ˆˆ ππ >    and  NNGN 11 ˆˆ ππ >  
 
12 If (12) holds, we have that: NNNG 22 ˆˆ ππ >  and  GNGG 22 ˆˆ ππ >  
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The Nash equilibrium strategy configuration in the status quo game ( *~Λ ) clearly depends on the 
value of the parameters. Fig 1a and 1b illustrates how *~Λ  depends on the value of s  andσ , where the 
fixed investment cost (F) is set to 1.5 and 0.5 in Fig 1a and 1b respectively.13 
 
Figure 1a: Regions defining equilibrium outcomes in the ( σ,s ) plane with F=1.5 
 
Figure 1b: Regions defining equilibrium outcomes in the ( σ,s ) plane with F=0.5 
                                                 
13 In these figures, a=3,τ=0.5  and .10 =c  
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The thick line in figures 1a and 1b represents condition (11)14 with strict equality, whereas the 
thin line represents condition (12)15. In the case where firm 1 has a technology advantage and its 
foreign market is relatively large (south-east in the diagrams), it will chose G, while firm 2 will 
chose N. By symmetry, the opposite strategies are chosen in the north-west corner of the 
diagrams. When F is reduced, these two indifference lines shift upwards and downwards 
respectively, and when they shift positions, the equilibrium changes from NN in Figure 1a to 
GG in Figure 1b. Since the two indifference lines are always parallel, no parameter combination 
allows both GG and NN to be equilibrium within the feasible ),( σs  space. If we reduce 
knowledge transfer costs (increase τ ), the indifference lines become steeper, as illustrated in 
Figure 2. Hence, an increase in τ  contributes to a larger area where .~* GG=Λ    
 
Figure 2: Changes in the regions defining equilibrium outcomes in the ( σ,s ) plane with an 
increase in τ  
 
 
                                                 
    14 Eq.(11) can be rearranged as: στ
aa
Fca
s )12(
310 ++−−−<  
    15 Eq.(12) can be rearranged as: σττ
aa
Fc
s )12(
320 +++−>  
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5.  Bargaining for an acquisition 
 
5.1 The equilibrium bid  
We first identify the equilibrium offer or bid ( iB ) when firm i  wants to acquire firm j . The problem can 
be solve as a cooperative game16, using the Nash fixed – threat bargaining model (see Friedman 1990; 
Petit, 1990). The players bargain on how to divide the profits associated with the acquisition. The status 
quo equilibrium *~Λ provides the payoffs obtained by the players if they fail to make an agreement, called 
the disagreement outcomes or status quo profits ),( dj
d
i ππ .  
The profit of the acquirer (firm i) is given by: 
   ii
Ai
i
Ai
i BTV −−=Π                                                                   (17) 
where AiiV represents the gross profits of the global monopolist (see Appendix I). Notice that 
AAj
j
Ai
i VVV ==  since both firms face exactly the same markets and technology as a global monopolist. 
Due to the best practise effect, unit cost in each market does not depend on which firm makes the 
acquisition. Consequently, from here on we drop the firm specific notation for AV . To calculate the net 
profit of the acquirer, we must subtract iT  which represents transaction costs associated with the deal, as 
well as the acquisition price iB paid to j. Transaction costs associated with an acquisition ( iT ) arise due to 
legal fees, consulting fees and corporate finance costs, as well as costs related to the integration of the 
two work forces and to the managerial resources to be devoted to the acquisition. We model the 
transaction costs as a linear function of the size of the deal, which in turn is a function of the target firm 
capitalisation. This is equivalent to the target firm status quo profits: 
  djiT γπ=       where              1> 0>γ                                                        (18) 
The profits of the target firm are equal to the acquisition price: 
i
Ai
j B=Π                                                                                                    (19) 
The equilibrium bid iB  is given by the Nash bargaining solution of the cooperative game described in 
Appendix III.  With constant marginal utility of profits, the bargaining solution provides the standard 
result that excess profits from the acquisition (i.e. the overall gain from cooperation) is evenly divided 
between the two players. Thus, profits for the target firm becomes 
{ } [ ]didjAdjdidjAdjAiji VVB ππγππγππ −−+=+−−+=Π= )1(21)()(21                                   (20) 
where the term in curly brackets represents the overall gain from cooperation. The acquisition price paid 
for the target firm reflects what firm j profits could have become if the acquisition did not take place.  
As to the acquirer, firm i will earn the following profits: 
                                                 
  16 This way of dealing with the problem is in line with the empirical finding that  the overwhelming number of         
M&A both domestic and international are friendly rather than hostile takeovers. 
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{ } [ ]didjAdjdidjAdiAii VV ππγππγππ ++−=+−−+=Π )1(21)()(21                                           (21) 
which represents the status quo profit plus the bargaining share of firm i. The profits from acquisition for 
both firms are increasing in the global monopolist profits, increasing in own status quo profits, but 
decreasing in the rival’s status quo profits.  
 
5.2 Condition for a cross border  acquisition to take place   
An acquisition equilibrium requires that both firms gain from it as compared to the status quo 
equilibrium profit, that is di
Ai
i π>Π  and djAij π>Π .  We find, using (20) and (21), that both these 
conditions are satisfied iff: 
d
i
d
j
AV ππγ ++> )1(                                                                                 (22) 
If there are excess profits from the acquisition made by firm i, the acquisition will take place since both 
firms will benefit from it. 17  This leads us to the following proposition:  
Proposition 1:  
An acquisition will take place if the gross profit from the acquisition ( AV ) is larger than the sum of the 
two firms’ status quo profits plus the transaction costs.  
 
5.3 Condition for being the acquirer  
We know that firm i would like to be the acquirer if its profit is higher than the profit it receives from 
being the target, that is if Aji
Ai
i Π>Π , which implies from (20) and (21) that:                                                                       
[ ] [ ]djdiAdidjA VV ππγππγ −−+>++− )1(21)1(21                                 (23)                         
   which can be reduced to:  
d
j
d
i ππ >                                                                                       (24)                        
The same condition applies to Ajj
Ai
j Π>Π , so we have  that Ai  is the optimal entry mode ( Ai=Λ* )  
 iff dj
d
i ππ > . We can thus state: 
Proposition 2:  
It is always the firm with the highest status quo profit that becomes the acquirer, regardless of the size of 
01 >> γ . 
 
To sum up, an acquisition brings the following benefits and costs compared to greenfield entry: 
(i) Market power effect  
(ii) Best practice effect (providing lower unit variable cost.) 
                                                 
17 This is the traditional criterion for merger incentive in the IO literature, which however  overlooks transaction 
costs.  See e.g. Horn and Persson (2001). 
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(iii) Savings on fixed costs, if the status quo equilibrium implies greenfield FDI. 
However a cross border acquisition does also imply 
             (iv) additional transaction costs.  
The strength of these effects will depend on the extent of market size asymmetries (s), technological 
asymmetries (σ) and on the status quo equilibrium (as summarized in Table 1).   
Table 1 
Benefits from an acquisition in different scenarios (a) 
                                                                                           STATUS QUO EQUILIBRIUM ( *
~Λ ) 
 
NN NG (GN) (b) GG 
BEST PRACTICE EFFECT 
 
  
1. (s=0.5, σ=0.5)   
0   + 
2. (s>0.5, σ=0.5)   
 
0 + ++ 
3. (s=0.5, σ>0.5)   
++ (c) + (d) ++ 
4.  (s<0.5, σ>0.5) (e)   
 
++ (c) + (d) ++ 
MARKET POWER  EFFECT 
   
1. (s=0.5, σ=0.5)   
0  + 
2. (s>0.5, σ=0.5)   
 
0 + ++ 
3. (s=0.5, σ>0.5)   
0 + ++ 
4.  (s<0.5, σ>0.5 (e)    
 
0 + ++ 
SAVINGS ON FIXED COSTS 
   
1. (s=0.5, σ=0.5)   
0  + 
2. (s>0.5, σ=0.5)   
 
0 + ++ 
3. (s=0.5, σ>0.5)   
0 + ++ 
4.  (s<0.5, σ>0.5) (e)     
 
0 + ++ 
Note:  (a)  ++ indicates stronger positive effect than +.  The strength of the effect is   
                  comparable only within the same row. 
           (b) NG in case 2; GN in case 3 and 4.  
           (c)  Iff  )1( στσ −> . Otherwise: 0 
           (d)  Iff  )1( στσ −≠ . Otherwise: 0 
           (e)  For (s>0.5, σ>0.5) same results as 4.  
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6.  Equilibrium solution to the full game  
 
We initially present analytical results and then revert to simulations. In Figures 4-7, simulation results are 
presented for the different combinations of firm characteristics in the ( σ,s ) space. In the upper half of 
each matrix, country I is the largest, while it is the smallest in the lower half. We focus our attention to 
the range [ )1,5.0∈σ  where firm 1 is a technological leader, since this region represents all relevant 
combinations of technologies and market sizes.  In the figures, the left hand matrix illustrates simulation 
results for the status quo game, while the right hand matrix provides the solution to the full game.  In the 
following discussion, we start out with the simplest case where firms and countries are symmetric, and 
then add asymmetries as we go along. 
 
6.1  Full symmetry (s=0.5, σ=0.5)   
In the case of both market size and technology symmetry, the left hand side of conditions (11) and (12) 
become identical, thus )(~* NN=Λ and )(~* GG=Λ are the only feasible solutions. It is not possible to 
identify a potential acquirer since dj
d
i ππ = .  An acquisition generates a monopoly in both countries and 
since the best practice technology will always be 5.0=σ we have that: 
NN
i
AV π2=                                                                                                                                   (25)     
 If )(~* NN=Λ , the profit of the acquirer is given by: 
[ ] NNiNNiNNiNNjAAii V ππγππγ <−=++−=Π )5.01()1((21                                                           (26)                         
Thus under full symmetry, profits from the acquisition will always be lower than profits from the status-
quo NN equilibrium. In such scenario foreign entry by acquisition is not feasible as none of the potential 
benefits from an acquisition (best practise, increased market power, saving on fixed cost) will be at work 
to compensate for transaction costs (see Table 1). However, this does not have to be the case if 
)(~* GG=Λ ,due to technology transfer costs, stronger competition, and F (plant fixed cost). If 
)(~* GG=Λ , the condition for a cross border acquisition to take place (Eq. (22)) becomes: 
GG
i
GG
i
NN
i
π
ππγ )(2 −<                                                               (27)                        
implying that an acquisition is feasible in equilibrium under full symmetry since GGi
NN
i ππ >   for all 
parameter values.  Note that )(~* GG=Λ  may materialize even though both firms get higher profits from 
NN, as we may face a prisoner’s dilemma situation.  It follows that: 
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Proposition 3:  
With full symmetry, an acquisition will never be the optimal entry mode if )(~* NN=Λ . However, if 
)(~* GG=Λ  an acquisition may arise as the solution of the full game.  
In figure 3, we have depicted the combinations of τ  and F, for which )(~* GG=Λ  or )(~* NN=Λ  
in the fully symmetric case.  
                                                 
Figure 3: Changes in the regions defining equilibrium outcomes in the ( F,τ ) plane with an 
increase in a  
 
Clearly, if τ  is large and F is small, GG will be preferred to NN, and the larger a is, the wider is the 
range of  (τ ,F) combinations supporting )(~* GG=Λ , since a larger overall market size reduces the share 
of fixed costs (F) for each unit produced abroad. Thus, the indifference line shifts towards southeast as a 
increases. 
 
6.2  Market size asymmetry (s>0.5, σ=0.5)   
Here, the incentive to invest abroad is greater for firm 2 which is based in the small country  
( )12.()11.( EqLHSEqLHS < ). Thus we may have )(~* NN=Λ or )(~* GG=Λ , or )(~* NG=Λ . But 
)(~* GN=Λ  can be ruled out, as the smaller size of country II discourages firm 1 from entering it. If the 
parameters values are such that )(~* NN=Λ , Firm 2 from the small country has the lowest profit as 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
t
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2F
GG 
NN 
a=3
a=4
a=3.5
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5.0>σ . This will also be the case if )(~* GG=Λ  when 1<τ , since firm 2 will have a cost disadvantage 
in the large market due to the cost of internal technology transfer.18 Simulation results show that if 
)(~* NG=Λ  firm 1 will generally have the highest profit (see Figures 4a-5a, the upper part of the first 
column identified with a thick frame).19 
          Figure 4a: The status quo game                            Figure 4b: The full game  
 
Positive values: π1 > π2 Positive values: Acquisition equilibrium
Equilibrium strategies: NG NN GN GG Equlibrium strategies: A1 A2 NO
0.9 1.39 1.62 1.84 2.07 2.29 2.52 4.62 4.73 4.84 0.9 1.46 1.55 1.64 1.71 1.78 1.85 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.85 1.35 1.57 1.78 2.00 3.90 4.00 4.10 4.20 4.31 0.85 1.44 1.52 1.60 1.68 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04
0.8 1.28 1.49 3.20 3.30 3.40 3.50 3.60 3.70 3.80 0.8 1.40 1.48 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.10
0.75 2.50 2.60 2.70 2.80 2.90 3.00 3.10 3.20 3.30 0.75 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.16
0.7 2.00 2.10 2.20 2.30 2.40 2.50 2.60 2.70 2.80 0.7 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.21
0.65 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80 1.90 2.00 2.10 2.20 2.30 0.65 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.26
0.6 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80 0.6 -0.11 -0.11 -0.08 -0.02 0.05 0.11 0.18 0.24 0.30
0.55 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30 0.55 -0.15 -0.14 -0.12 -0.04 0.04 0.11 0.19 0.26 0.34
     s 0.5 -0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80      s 0.5 -0.20 -0.19 -0.16 -0.07 0.02 0.11 0.19 0.28 0.37
0.45 -0.50 -0.40 -0.30 -0.20 -0.10 -0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.45 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15 -0.07 0.01 0.09 0.19 0.29 0.39
0.4 -1.00 -0.90 -0.80 -0.70 -0.60 -0.50 -0.40 0.56 0.74 0.4 -0.11 -0.12 -0.10 -0.01 0.08 0.18 0.27 1.27 1.29
0.35 -1.50 -1.40 -1.30 -1.20 -1.10 0.05 0.23 0.42 0.60 0.35 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 0.04 0.15 1.23 1.28 1.31 1.34
0.3 -2.00 -1.90 -1.80 -0.47 -0.27 -0.08 0.11 0.31 0.50 0.3 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 1.23 1.26 1.28 1.31 1.35 1.39
0.25 -2.50 -0.98 -0.78 -0.58 -0.38 -0.17 0.03 0.23 0.43 0.25 -0.03 1.29 1.23 1.27 1.30 1.33 1.35 1.40 1.44
0.2 -1.28 -1.07 -0.86 -0.66 -0.45 -0.24 -0.03 0.18 0.39 0.2 1.40 1.32 1.26 1.30 1.34 1.37 1.39 1.44 1.49
0.15 -1.35 -1.14 -0.92 -0.70 -0.49 -0.27 -0.05 0.16 0.38 0.15 1.44 1.34 1.28 1.33 1.37 1.41 1.43 1.49 1.54
0.1 -1.39 -1.17 -0.95 -0.72 -0.50 -0.27 -0.05 0.18 0.41 0.1 1.46 1.36 1.30 1.35 1.40 1.44 1.47 1.53 1.59
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9
σ σ
Parameter values: a=5 F=1 τ =0.7 γ =0.2  
Figure 5a: The status quo game        Figure 5b: The full game  
 
Positive values: π1 > π2 Positive values: Acquisition equilibrium
Equilibrium strategies: NG NN GN GG Equlibrium strategies: A1 A2 NO
0.9 0.88 1.37 1.86 2.35 2.84 3.33 3.82 4.33 4.84 0.9 -0.22 0.02 0.27 0.52 0.76 1.00 1.22 1.43 1.61
0.85 0.64 1.12 1.59 2.21 2.71 3.22 3.72 4.22 4.72 0.85 -0.23 0.01 0.25 0.65 0.87 1.08 1.27 1.45 1.61
0.8 0.60 1.10 1.61 2.11 2.61 3.12 3.62 4.12 4.62 0.8 0.01 0.22 0.43 0.66 0.89 1.09 1.29 1.46 1.63
0.75 0.50 1.00 1.51 2.01 2.51 3.02 3.52 4.02 4.52 0.75 0.06 0.24 0.43 0.67 0.89 1.10 1.29 1.47 1.63
0.7 0.40 0.90 1.41 1.91 2.41 2.92 3.42 3.92 4.42 0.7 0.09 0.25 0.43 0.67 0.89 1.10 1.29 1.47 1.63
0.65 0.30 0.80 1.31 1.81 2.31 2.82 3.32 3.82 4.32 0.65 0.11 0.25 0.41 0.65 0.87 1.08 1.28 1.45 1.61
0.6 0.20 0.70 1.21 1.71 2.21 2.72 3.22 3.72 4.22 0.6 0.12 0.24 0.39 0.62 0.85 1.06 1.25 1.43 1.59
0.55 0.10 0.60 1.11 1.61 2.11 2.62 3.12 3.62 4.12 0.55 0.12 0.22 0.35 0.59 0.81 1.02 1.21 1.39 1.55
     s 0.5 0.00 0.50 1.01 1.51 2.01 2.52 3.02 3.52 4.02      s 0.5 0.11 0.19 0.30 0.54 0.76 0.97 1.16 1.34 1.50
0.45 -0.10 0.40 0.91 1.41 1.91 2.42 2.92 3.42 3.92 0.45 0.12 0.14 0.24 0.48 0.70 0.91 1.10 1.28 1.44
0.4 -0.20 0.30 0.81 1.31 1.81 2.32 2.82 3.32 3.82 0.4 0.12 0.09 0.17 0.41 0.63 0.84 1.03 1.21 1.37
0.35 -0.30 0.20 0.71 1.21 1.71 2.22 2.72 3.22 3.72 0.35 0.11 0.02 0.09 0.32 0.55 0.76 0.95 1.13 1.29
0.3 -0.40 0.10 0.61 1.11 1.61 2.12 2.62 3.12 3.62 0.3 0.09 -0.05 -0.01 0.23 0.46 0.66 0.86 1.04 1.20
0.25 -0.50 0.00 0.51 1.01 1.51 2.02 2.52 3.32 3.77 0.25 0.06 -0.14 -0.11 0.13 0.35 0.56 0.75 0.59 0.76
0.2 -0.60 -0.10 0.41 1.10 1.56 2.02 2.48 2.94 3.40 0.2 0.01 -0.21 -0.23 -0.23 -0.01 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.78
0.15 -0.64 -0.17 0.31 0.78 1.26 1.74 2.21 2.69 3.17 0.15 -0.23 -0.47 -0.54 -0.30 -0.06 0.16 0.38 0.59 0.79
0.1 -0.88 -0.39 0.10 0.59 1.09 1.58 2.07 2.56 3.06 0.1 -0.22 -0.48 -0.62 -0.37 -0.12 0.12 0.36 0.58 0.80
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9
σ σ
Parameter values: a=10 F=0.1 τ =0.7 γ =0.35
                                                 
18 Note that the market size asymmetry influences the relative profitability of the two producers in GG only when 
internal technology transfer is costly.  With s>0.5 and  σ=0.5, with τ=1 GGGG 21 ππ =  
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Turning to the solution of the full game, as in the completely symmetric case, if  )(~* NN=Λ  no 
acquisition may take place because there will be no best practice, market power, or fixed cost saving 
effects20. If )(~* GG=Λ ,  an acquisition may take place, but only )1(* A=Λ  is feasible since we know 
from above that GGGG 21 ππ > .  The results are confirmed by simulations in table 4-5. It follows that: 
 
Proposition 4:  
Market asymmetry alone (i.e. when 5.0=σ ) is not sufficient to stimulate a cross border acquisition 
when the threat is represented by two national monopolies. If the status quo equilibrium is GG, an 
acquisition may take place and the acquirer will be the firm from the large country. 
 
6.3  Technological asymmetry (s=0.5, σ>0.5)   
It is now necessary to take into consideration the best practice effect under acquisition. Firm 1, which is 
the technology leader, has a larger incentive to invest abroad due to lower variable costs. The feasible 
status quo equilibria are thus NN, GG and GN, while NG can be ruled out since  
)12.()11.( EqLHSEqLHS > . Here, the acquisition gross profit can be defined as the sum of the national 
monopoly profits plus the gains through adoption of the best practice (k). 
kV NNNNA ++= 21 ˆˆ ππ              where                                                                                           (28)                         
k = [ ] [ ]{ }


−>>−−+−−−−
−<
)1(0)1()()1()1(2
4
1
)1(                       0
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0 στσστσστσ
στσ
iffcas
iff
             (29) 
Thus due to the best practice effect, technology asymmetry alone (i.e. with 5.0=s ) provides incentives 
for an acquisition, also when the alternative to an acquisition is represented by two national monopolies. 
Notice that in the previous section, we found that market size asymmetry alone is not sufficient to trigger 
an acquisition when )(~* NN=Λ , but technology asymmetry is. An acquisition equilibrium will arise if 
the best practice effect fully compensates for the acquisition transaction costs, which requires from Eq. 
(22) that NNk 2πˆγ> . Notice that the probability of an acquisition is increasing in the technological 
asymmetry, since 0>∂
∂
σ
k  (consult the central row with a thick frame in Figures 4b for illustrations).21  
We can thus state:  
 
                                                 
19 In a few cases (that is if the difference between the size of the two markets is rather small and τ is high),  we may 
have ngng 12 ˆˆ ππ > . The likelihood that 012 >− NGNG ππ  is increasing in τ and decreasing in s (see Appendix IV). 
20 Due to σ=0.5 NNNNAV 21 ππ +=  and Eqs (28) and (29) are valid also in this scenario. 
21 Figure 5 shows that an acquisition may take place also when )(~ * GGS = or )(~* GNS = . 
 21
Proposition 5:  In the case of technological asymmetry and market size symmetry, an acquisition can 
take place also when )(~* NN=Λ .  
 
As to the identity of the acquirer, we can state the following22 (proof in Appendix V): 
 
Proposition 6:  
In the case of technological asymmetry and market size symmetry, the acquirer will always be the 
technology leader.  
 
 
6.4 Technology and market size asymmetry I: ( 5.0,5.0 >< σs  - leader from the small country) 
We now allow for both market size and technology asymmetries. Since there are no explicit solutions to 
the equilibrium strategy configurations, we relate our discussion to numerical simulations. When s<0.5 
and σ>0.5, we restrict ourselves to the lower half of the simulation tables. Since firm 1 now is the 
technological leader based in the small country, its incentive to choose greenfield FDI is larger than for 
firm 2 ( )12.()11.( EqLHSEqLHS > ), both due to the large foreign market size and the technological 
advantage. It follows that the possible status quo equilibrium are NN, GG, or GN, while NG can be ruled 
out.  
 
Figure 6a: Equilibrium strategies when F=2.5 
          The status quo game                     The full game  
Positive values: π1 > π2 Positive values: Acquisition equilibrium
Equilibrium strategies: NG NN GN GG Equlibrium strategies: A1 A2 NO
0.9 4.00 4.10 4.20 4.31 4.41 4.52 4.62 4.73 4.84 0.9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.85 3.50 3.60 3.70 3.80 3.90 4.00 4.10 4.20 4.31 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04
0.8 3.00 3.10 3.20 3.30 3.40 3.50 3.60 3.70 3.80 0.8 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.10
0.75 2.50 2.60 2.70 2.80 2.90 3.00 3.10 3.20 3.30 0.75 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.16
0.7 2.00 2.10 2.20 2.30 2.40 2.50 2.60 2.70 2.80 0.7 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.21
0.65 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80 1.90 2.00 2.10 2.20 2.30 0.65 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.26
0.6 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80 0.6 -0.11 -0.11 -0.08 -0.02 0.05 0.11 0.18 0.24 0.30
0.55 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30 0.55 -0.15 -0.14 -0.12 -0.04 0.04 0.11 0.19 0.26 0.34
     s 0.5 -0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80      s 0.5 -0.20 -0.19 -0.16 -0.07 0.02 0.11 0.19 0.28 0.37
0.45 -0.50 -0.40 -0.30 -0.20 -0.10 -0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.45 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15 -0.07 0.01 0.09 0.19 0.29 0.39
0.4 -1.00 -0.90 -0.80 -0.70 -0.60 -0.50 -0.40 -0.30 -0.20 0.4 -0.11 -0.12 -0.10 -0.01 0.08 0.18 0.27 0.36 0.45
0.35 -1.50 -1.40 -1.30 -1.20 -1.10 -1.00 -0.90 -0.80 -0.70 0.35 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 0.04 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.46 0.56
0.3 -2.00 -1.90 -1.80 -1.70 -1.60 -1.50 -1.40 -1.30 -1.20 0.3 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 0.09 0.20 0.32 0.43 0.55 0.66
0.25 -2.50 -2.40 -2.30 -2.20 -2.10 -2.00 -1.90 -1.80 -1.70 0.25 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.13 0.25 0.38 0.51 0.63 0.76
0.2 -3.00 -2.90 -2.80 -2.70 -2.60 -2.50 -2.40 -2.30 -2.20 0.2 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.16 0.30 0.44 0.58 0.71 0.85
0.15 -3.50 -3.40 -3.30 -3.20 -3.10 -3.00 -2.90 -2.80 -2.70 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.34 0.49 0.64 0.79 0.94
0.1 -4.00 -3.90 -3.80 -3.70 -3.60 -3.50 -3.40 -3.30 -3.20 0.1 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.20 0.37 0.53 0.69 0.86 1.02
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9
σ σ
Parameter values: a=5 F=2.5 τ =0.7 γ =0.2  
 
 
 
                                                 
22 This finding is also illustrated by the results in Figures 4-6. 
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Figure 6b: Equilibrium strategies when F=1 
 
0.9 1.39 1.62 1.84 2.07 2.29 2.52 4.62 4.73 4.84 0.9 1.46 1.55 1.64 1.71 1.78 1.85 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.85 1.35 1.57 1.78 2.00 3.90 4.00 4.10 4.20 4.31 0.85 1.44 1.52 1.60 1.68 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04
0.8 1.28 1.49 3.20 3.30 3.40 3.50 3.60 3.70 3.80 0.8 1.40 1.48 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.10
0.75 2.50 2.60 2.70 2.80 2.90 3.00 3.10 3.20 3.30 0.75 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.16
0.7 2.00 2.10 2.20 2.30 2.40 2.50 2.60 2.70 2.80 0.7 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.21
0.65 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80 1.90 2.00 2.10 2.20 2.30 0.65 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.26
0.6 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80 0.6 -0.11 -0.11 -0.08 -0.02 0.05 0.11 0.18 0.24 0.30
0.55 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30 0.55 -0.15 -0.14 -0.12 -0.04 0.04 0.11 0.19 0.26 0.34
     s 0.5 -0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80      s 0.5 -0.20 -0.19 -0.16 -0.07 0.02 0.11 0.19 0.28 0.37
0.45 -0.50 -0.40 -0.30 -0.20 -0.10 -0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.45 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15 -0.07 0.01 0.09 0.19 0.29 0.39
0.4 -1.00 -0.90 -0.80 -0.70 -0.60 -0.50 -0.40 0.56 0.74 0.4 -0.11 -0.12 -0.10 -0.01 0.08 0.18 0.27 1.27 1.29
0.35 -1.50 -1.40 -1.30 -1.20 -1.10 0.05 0.23 0.42 0.60 0.35 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 0.04 0.15 1.23 1.28 1.31 1.34
0.3 -2.00 -1.90 -1.80 -0.47 -0.27 -0.08 0.11 0.31 0.50 0.3 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 1.23 1.26 1.28 1.31 1.35 1.39
0.25 -2.50 -0.98 -0.78 -0.58 -0.38 -0.17 0.03 0.23 0.43 0.25 -0.03 1.29 1.23 1.27 1.30 1.33 1.35 1.40 1.44
0.2 -1.28 -1.07 -0.86 -0.66 -0.45 -0.24 -0.03 0.18 0.39 0.2 1.40 1.32 1.26 1.30 1.34 1.37 1.39 1.44 1.49
0.15 -1.35 -1.14 -0.92 -0.70 -0.49 -0.27 -0.05 0.16 0.38 0.15 1.44 1.34 1.28 1.33 1.37 1.41 1.43 1.49 1.54
0.1 -1.39 -1.17 -0.95 -0.72 -0.50 -0.27 -0.05 0.18 0.41 0.1 1.46 1.36 1.30 1.35 1.40 1.44 1.47 1.53 1.59
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9
σ σ
Parameter values: a=5 F=1 τ =0.7 γ =0.2  
 
 
Figure 6c: Equilibrium strategies when F=0.7 
 
0.9 1.09 1.32 1.54 1.77 1.99 2.22 2.45 2.68 2.91 0.9 1.10 1.19 1.28 1.35 1.42 1.49 1.55 1.60 1.64
0.85 1.05 1.27 1.48 1.70 1.91 2.12 2.34 2.55 4.31 0.85 1.08 1.16 1.24 1.32 1.39 1.45 1.51 1.56 0.04
0.8 0.98 1.19 1.39 1.60 1.81 2.01 3.60 3.70 3.80 0.8 1.04 1.12 1.20 1.28 1.36 1.43 0.07 0.08 0.10
0.75 0.88 1.08 1.27 1.47 2.90 3.00 3.10 3.20 3.30 0.75 1.01 1.08 1.16 1.24 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.16
0.7 0.74 0.93 2.20 2.30 2.40 2.50 2.60 2.70 2.80 0.7 0.97 1.03 -0.03 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.21
0.65 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80 1.90 2.00 2.10 2.20 2.30 0.65 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.26
0.6 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80 0.6 -0.11 -0.11 -0.08 -0.02 0.05 0.11 0.18 0.24 0.30
0.55 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30 0.55 -0.15 -0.14 -0.12 -0.04 0.04 0.11 0.19 0.26 0.34
     s 0.5 -0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 1.24 1.40      s 0.5 -0.20 -0.19 -0.16 -0.07 0.02 0.11 0.19 0.89 0.90
0.45 -0.50 -0.40 -0.30 -0.20 -0.10 0.69 0.86 1.03 1.20 0.45 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15 -0.07 0.01 0.87 0.90 0.93 0.94
0.4 -1.00 -0.90 -0.80 0.15 0.33 0.50 0.68 0.86 1.04 0.4 -0.11 -0.12 -0.10 0.81 0.86 0.90 0.94 0.97 0.99
0.35 -1.50 -0.39 -0.21 -0.02 0.16 0.35 0.53 0.72 0.90 0.35 -0.08 0.85 0.80 0.83 0.88 0.93 0.98 1.01 1.04
0.3 -0.74 -0.55 -0.36 -0.17 0.03 0.22 0.41 0.61 0.80 0.3 0.97 0.89 0.84 0.87 0.90 0.96 1.01 1.05 1.09
0.25 -0.88 -0.68 -0.48 -0.28 -0.08 0.13 0.33 0.53 0.73 0.25 1.01 0.93 0.87 0.91 0.94 0.99 1.05 1.10 1.14
0.2 -0.98 -0.77 -0.56 -0.36 -0.15 0.06 0.27 0.48 0.69 0.2 1.04 0.96 0.90 0.94 0.98 1.02 1.09 1.14 1.19
0.15 -1.05 -0.84 -0.62 -0.40 -0.19 0.03 0.25 0.46 0.68 0.15 1.08 0.98 0.92 0.97 1.01 1.05 1.12 1.19 1.24
0.1 -1.09 -0.87 -0.65 -0.42 -0.20 0.03 0.25 0.48 0.71 0.1 1.10 1.00 0.94 0.99 1.04 1.09 1.16 1.23 1.29
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9
σ σ
Parameter values: a=5 F=0.7 τ =0.7 γ =0.2  
 
We first concentrate on the case where )(~* NN=Λ , illustrated in Figures 6a-c. An acquisition can be 
profitable even though )(~* NN=Λ since there are acquisition benefits due to the best practise effect.23  
)(* Ai=Λ  requires that these benefits more than compensate the acquisition transaction costs.  Note from 
Eq. (29) that the best practice benefits increase in the extent of the technological leadership of firm 1, in 
the transferability of the technology and in the size of the laggard home country (country II). And in fact 
we see from Figure 6a that if technology asymmetry is small and the difference in country size is 
moderate, there is no scope for significant best practice benefits, hence an acquisition will not take place. 
Notice that for any given technology asymmetry, a smaller s increases the attractiveness of an 
acquisition, since larger market asymmetries boosts the best practice effect.  
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What is the identity of the acquirer? In Appendix VI it is shown that if )(~* NN=Λ , we have that 
NNNN
12 ˆˆ ππ >  iff: 
                                             [ ] )1()1( σσ −−>−− ss                                     (30)  
that is if the market size asymmetry effect is strong relative to the technological asymmetry effect.  We 
also show that NNNN 12 ˆˆ ππ >  is satisfied for all 33.0≤s  and σ>0.5.  In other words, with )(~* NN=Λ and a 
large market size asymmetry, the laggard from the large country will have higher profits. Thus, if an 
acquisition takes place, )2(* A=Λ , and the technology leader from the small country will be acquired. In 
Figure 6a, where )(~* NN=Λ  for all ( σ,s ) combinations – it is shown that A2 is the optimal entry mode 
for a rather broad range of ( σ,s ) within the ( 5.0,5.0 >< σs ) scenario.  Only a limited set of 
configurations allow )1(* A=Λ . To illustrate this, concentrate on the area in Figure 6a with a small 
market size asymmetry (s=0.45). As we increase σ, we move from )(* NN=Λ , to )2(* A=Λ and finally 
to )1(* A=Λ . The first change in equilibrium entry strategy is driven by the stronger best practice effect.  
But since the technological advantage for firm 1 is relatively small, the market size asymmetry effect 
dominates. Thus, we have  NNNN 12 ˆˆ ππ >  and Λ*=(A2). This is illustrated with the negative values in the 
left matrix in Figure 6a. The second shift in equilibrium is driven by the stronger technology asymmetry, 
generating higher status quo profits for firm 1. This is illustrated by the growing positive values in the 
left hand matrix in Figure 6a.   
 
Result 1:  
If the technological leader is based in the small country and *~Λ =(NN), under rather general conditions, 
the leader will be acquired by the laggard from the large country.  
 
Moving from Figure 6a through 6b and further to 6c, we simulate the effect of a reduction in F, which is 
equivalent to a multilateral liberalization of greenfield FDI. Such an exercise is much in line with the 
suggested MAI-treaty reform. One would expect that such a liberalization increases the incentive to 
choose greenfield FDI, yet our model show that it may just as well raise the incentives to engage in an 
acquisition, reducing the likelihood of greenfield FDI. When )(~* GN=Λ , the profitability of an 
acquisition is higher as compared to )(~* NN=Λ . In addition to the best practice effect, which in the 
scenario ( 5.0,5.0 >< σs ) is relevant independently of *~Λ , an acquisition now profits from reduced 
competition and saving on fixed costs (see Table 1). Consequently, if a fall in F leads to a strategy shift 
from )(~* NN=Λ  to )(~* GN=Λ , we have that an acquisition is the optimal mode of entry  for a wider 
                                                 
23 Eq. (31) holds also for the ( 5.0,5.0 >< σs ) case. We are assuming that the condition )1( στσ −>  holds. 
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range of parameter values (the white area in the right hand matrixes in Figure 6 progressively shrinks as 
we move from 6a to 6b and then to 6c).  With )(~* GN=Λ  the leader from the small country will enjoy 
monopoly profits in its home market, and if )1( στσ −>  the leader will also obtain higher operating 
profits in the host country compared to its rival. On the other hand, firm 1 by becoming a MNE will faces 
additional fixed costs due to the new plant abroad. Thus, there is no analytical solution that identifies 
which producer will have the larger profits in general, and thus, who is the potential acquirer. 
Simulations results indicate that a fall in F, leading to a strategy shift, has an effect on the 
identity of the acquirer, which depends on whether the technology leader from the small country is a 
strong or a weak leader.24 Let us look at the strong leader first (large σ ). In Figure 6b the technology 
leader from the small country benefits significantly more from its technological advantage as compared 
to the situation in Figure 6a. Due to the fall in F, firm 1 is now able to exploit its advantage in the world 
market via greenfield FDI, and the benefits from investing abroad increase in τ  (lower the technology 
transfer costs). Thus, when  *~Λ  shifts from NN to GN, we have that dd 21 ˆˆ ππ > for a larger range of the  
( σ,s ) combinations. And thus the range of situations for which )1(* A=Λ  widens, as shown by a 
comparison of Figure 6a with 6b and 6c. If the leader is weak (σ  is close to 0.5), the range of  ( σ,s ) 
combinations for which we have )2(* A=Λ  increases, indicating that the weak leader is more likely to be 
the target of a cross border acquisition when F falls.  
To illustrate this, let us start out with a market asymmetry of s=0.3. If F is high as in Figure 6a, 
we have )(* NN=Λ for 5.06.0 >≥ σ and )2(* A=Λ  for 6.0>σ . The technology leader will be taken 
over by the follower only if its technological advantage generates sufficient best practise benefits to 
compensate for acquisition transaction costs. If F is low as in Figure 6c, we have Λ*=(A1) for 7.0≥σ , 
due to the large benefits associated with one way  multinational expansion for the strong leader. So the 
strong leader from the small country will be the acquirer. In the case of the weak leader, the probability 
of been a target increases, as we have )2(* A=Λ  also for values of σ  for which in 6a we have 
)(* NN=Λ . In this case the  fall in F makes multinational expansion profitable, but the strategy shift 
does not generate sufficient benefits for firm 1 to become the most profitable of the two firms. At the 
same time, the threat from firm 1 (the leader) to enter country II via greenfield FDI creates an additional 
incentive for the laggard to make an acquisition (as it lowers its status quo profits). So for firm 2, being 
the acquirer creates both best practise benefits and market power benefits. Consequently, if small country 
governments are concerned about technologically advanced national firms being acquired by firms from 
larger countries, they should be aware of the effect of reducing F in the case where their technology 
leaders are weak leaders.  
 
                                                 
24 The threshold value of σ for strong leadership depends on other parameters values.  
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Result 2:  
Multilateral greenfield FDI liberalization (i.e. a reduction in F) increases the likelihood of an 
acquisition, as compared to the case of segmented markets (i.e. )(~* NN=Λ )25.  
 
Result 3:  
If  the technological leader is based in the small country, the effect of multilateral greenfield FDI 
liberalization on the identity of the acquirer depends on the extent of the technological gap. If firm 1 is a 
weak technology leader (σ close to 0,5), its probability of being acquired by the laggard increases. If it 
is a strong technology leader, its probability of  acquiring  the laggard from the large market increases.  
 
If  the threat is cross-greenfield FDI ( )(~* GG=Λ ), the gains from an acquisition are further enlarged as 
saving on fixed costs is doubled and the gains from reduced competition relates to both markets (see 
Table 1). Hence, only if acquisition costs are large, the firms will decide not to merge (consult the 
simulations in Figure 5 where Λ*=(Ai) for most parameter combinations even though γ  is as large as 
0.35). Furthermore, if )1( στσ −> , the leader from the small country will always be the acquirer 
( )1(* A=Λ ), since it will have higher operating profits due to a better technology in both markets, while 
facing the same fixed costs. 
 
In Figure 7 we simulate a reduction in technology transfer costs (higherτ ) which may be due to 
technological development in ICT or to greater attention devoted by firms to know-how management.  
The effects are similar to those driven by a fall in F. Moving from Figure 7a to 7b, we see that as τ  
increases, the white area (i.e. the non acquisition area) shrinks. It becomes relatively more profitable for 
the technology leader to go multinational, and the smaller the transfer costs are, the higher will its profit 
be relative to the opponent. Furthermore, the effect on the identity of the acquirer is also similar to the 
effect from a fall in F. If you start out from s=0.3 in Figure 7a and cut transfer costs (see 7b), you will 
move from )(* NN=Λ to Λ*=(A2) if the firm 1 is a weak technology leader, while you move from 
)2(* A=Λ  to )1(* A=Λ if firm 1 is a strong technology leader.   
 
 
 
                                                 
25 This result holds also for the other scenarios considered. 
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Figure 7a: Equilibrium strategies when 7.0=τ  
 
          The status quo game                     The full game  
Positive values: π1 > π2 Positive values: Acquisition equilibrium
Equilibrium strategies: NG NN GN GG Equlibrium strategies: A1 A2 NO
0,9 1,39 1,62 1,84 2,07 2,29 2,52 4,62 4,73 4,84 0,9 1,46 1,55 1,64 1,71 1,78 1,85 0,00 0,00 0,00
0,85 1,35 1,57 1,78 2,00 3,90 4,00 4,10 4,20 4,31 0,85 1,44 1,52 1,60 1,68 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,04
0,8 1,28 1,49 3,20 3,30 3,40 3,50 3,60 3,70 3,80 0,8 1,40 1,48 0,00 0,02 0,03 0,05 0,07 0,08 0,10
0,75 2,50 2,60 2,70 2,80 2,90 3,00 3,10 3,20 3,30 0,75 -0,03 -0,02 -0,01 0,02 0,05 0,08 0,10 0,13 0,16
0,7 2,00 2,10 2,20 2,30 2,40 2,50 2,60 2,70 2,80 0,7 -0,05 -0,05 -0,03 0,01 0,05 0,09 0,13 0,17 0,21
0,65 1,50 1,60 1,70 1,80 1,90 2,00 2,10 2,20 2,30 0,65 -0,08 -0,07 -0,05 0,00 0,05 0,11 0,16 0,21 0,26
0,6 1,00 1,10 1,20 1,30 1,40 1,50 1,60 1,70 1,80 0,6 -0,11 -0,11 -0,08 -0,02 0,05 0,11 0,18 0,24 0,30
0,55 0,50 0,60 0,70 0,80 0,90 1,00 1,10 1,20 1,30 0,55 -0,15 -0,14 -0,12 -0,04 0,04 0,11 0,19 0,26 0,34
     s 0,5 -0,00 0,10 0,20 0,30 0,40 0,50 0,60 0,70 0,80      s 0,5 -0,20 -0,19 -0,16 -0,07 0,02 0,11 0,19 0,28 0,37
0,45 -0,50 -0,40 -0,30 -0,20 -0,10 -0,00 0,10 0,20 0,30 0,45 -0,15 -0,16 -0,15 -0,07 0,01 0,09 0,19 0,29 0,39
0,4 -1,00 -0,90 -0,80 -0,70 -0,60 -0,50 -0,40 0,56 0,74 0,4 -0,11 -0,12 -0,10 -0,01 0,08 0,18 0,27 1,27 1,29
0,35 -1,50 -1,40 -1,30 -1,20 -1,10 0,05 0,23 0,42 0,60 0,35 -0,08 -0,08 -0,06 0,04 0,15 1,23 1,28 1,31 1,34
0,3 -2,00 -1,90 -1,80 -0,47 -0,27 -0,08 0,11 0,31 0,50 0,3 -0,05 -0,06 -0,03 1,23 1,26 1,28 1,31 1,35 1,39
0,25 -2,50 -0,98 -0,78 -0,58 -0,38 -0,17 0,03 0,23 0,43 0,25 -0,03 1,29 1,23 1,27 1,30 1,33 1,35 1,40 1,44
0,2 -1,28 -1,07 -0,86 -0,66 -0,45 -0,24 -0,03 0,18 0,39 0,2 1,40 1,32 1,26 1,30 1,34 1,37 1,39 1,44 1,49
0,15 -1,35 -1,14 -0,92 -0,70 -0,49 -0,27 -0,05 0,16 0,38 0,15 1,44 1,34 1,28 1,33 1,37 1,41 1,43 1,49 1,54
0,1 -1,39 -1,17 -0,95 -0,72 -0,50 -0,27 -0,05 0,18 0,41 0,1 1,46 1,36 1,30 1,35 1,40 1,44 1,47 1,53 1,59
0,5 0,55 0,6 0,65 0,7 0,75 0,8 0,85 0,9 0,5 0,55 0,6 0,65 0,7 0,75 0,8 0,85 0,9
σ σ
Parameter values: a=5 F=1 τ =0.7 γ =0.2  
 
 
Figure 7b: Equilibrium strategies when 1=τ  
 
Positive values: π1 > π2 Positive values: Acquisition equilibrium
Equilibrium strategies: NG NN GN GG Equlibrium strategies: A1 A2 NO
0,9 1,00 1,27 1,53 1,80 2,07 2,33 2,60 4,73 4,84 0,9 1,29 1,41 1,53 1,63 1,73 1,82 1,90 0,03 0,04
0,85 0,98 1,24 1,49 1,75 2,00 4,00 4,10 4,20 4,31 0,85 1,28 1,40 1,52 1,63 1,73 0,06 0,08 0,09 0,11
0,8 0,94 1,18 1,43 1,67 3,40 3,50 3,60 3,70 3,80 0,8 1,26 1,39 1,51 1,63 0,10 0,12 0,15 0,17 0,20
0,75 0,86 1,09 2,70 2,80 2,90 3,00 3,10 3,20 3,30 0,75 1,23 1,37 0,05 0,09 0,13 0,18 0,21 0,25 0,29
0,7 2,00 2,10 2,20 2,30 2,40 2,50 2,60 2,70 2,80 0,7 -0,05 0,00 0,06 0,11 0,17 0,22 0,28 0,33 0,38
0,65 1,50 1,60 1,70 1,80 1,90 2,00 2,10 2,20 2,30 0,65 -0,08 -0,01 0,06 0,13 0,19 0,26 0,33 0,40 0,46
0,6 1,00 1,10 1,20 1,30 1,40 1,50 1,60 1,70 1,80 0,6 -0,11 -0,03 0,05 0,13 0,22 0,30 0,38 0,46 0,54
0,55 0,50 0,60 0,70 0,80 0,90 1,00 1,10 1,20 1,30 0,55 -0,15 -0,06 0,04 0,13 0,23 0,33 0,42 0,51 0,61
     s 0,5 -0,00 0,10 0,20 0,30 0,40 0,50 0,60 1,31 1,51      s 0,5 -0,20 -0,09 0,02 0,13 0,24 0,35 0,46 1,23 1,22
0,45 -0,50 -0,40 -0,30 -0,20 -0,10 -0,00 0,95 1,15 1,36 0,45 -0,15 -0,05 0,05 0,16 0,26 0,36 1,28 1,29 1,29
0,4 -1,00 -0,90 -0,80 -0,70 0,39 0,60 0,81 1,02 1,24 0,4 -0,11 0,00 0,12 0,24 1,27 1,31 1,33 1,35 1,36
0,35 -1,50 -1,40 -0,18 0,04 0,26 0,48 0,70 0,92 1,15 0,35 -0,08 0,05 1,23 1,26 1,31 1,36 1,39 1,41 1,43
0,3 -2,00 -0,52 -0,30 -0,07 0,16 0,39 0,62 0,86 1,09 0,3 -0,05 1,25 1,28 1,31 1,35 1,40 1,44 1,48 1,50
0,25 -0,86 -0,62 -0,39 -0,15 0,09 0,33 0,58 0,82 1,06 0,25 1,23 1,28 1,32 1,35 1,39 1,45 1,50 1,54 1,57
0,2 -0,94 -0,69 -0,44 -0,19 0,06 0,31 0,56 0,81 1,07 0,2 1,26 1,31 1,36 1,40 1,43 1,50 1,56 1,61 1,64
0,15 -0,98 -0,73 -0,47 -0,21 0,05 0,31 0,58 0,84 1,11 0,15 1,28 1,34 1,39 1,43 1,48 1,55 1,62 1,67 1,72
0,1 -1,00 -0,73 -0,46 -0,19 0,08 0,35 0,62 0,90 1,17 0,1 1,29 1,36 1,42 1,46 1,52 1,60 1,67 1,74 1,79
0,5 0,55 0,6 0,65 0,7 0,75 0,8 0,85 0,9 0,5 0,55 0,6 0,65 0,7 0,75 0,8 0,85 0,9
σ σ
Parameter values: a=5 F=1 τ =1 γ =0.2
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6.5  Technology and market size asymmetry II: ( 5.0,5.0 >> σs  - leader from the large country) 
Firm 1 is the technological leader and is based in the large country.  Market size and technological 
effects run in the opposite direction. All the four status quo outcomes are possible (NN, GG, GN, GG).  
If )(~* NN=Λ , firm 1 will have a larger profits; that is also the case in the GG outcome (see Figures 4 - 7 
for illustrations). In the case of one way FDI, if the potential MNE is firm 1 (the GN case) here too firm 
1 will have a larger status quo profit26.  However, if the incentive from a large host market size prevail 
(the NG case) due to the contrasting effect from technology and market size difference, we cannot have a 
clear reply on which firm will have the largest status quo size and thus may become the acquirer. 
 
Result 4: 
In the case of a technology leader from a large country, under rather general conditions, this firm will be 
the acquirer in case of a cross border take-over. 
 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
In the theoretical industrial organisation literature, the study of why firms decide to enter a foreign 
market through greenfield investment or M&As is in an infant stage. So far, no study has succeeded in 
identifying what kind of firms chooses to make a cross border acquisition and what kind of firms chooses 
instead to be acquired by foreign firms. In this paper we apply a simple bargaining model to determine 
the identity of the acquirer, in a setting where firms differ with respect to technological level and 
countries vary with respect to market size. We are thus able to analyse whether technology leaders from 
small countries may find it optimal to acquire technology laggards from large countries, or vice versa.  
Our model contains important features that seem to play a pivotal role in the choice between 
conducting an acquisition or establishing a new subsidiary abroad through greenfield investment. We 
consider the gains from implementing a best practice technology, and take into account knowledge 
transfer costs and transaction costs associated with a merger due to legal fees, consulting fees and costs 
of integrating the two company cultures. Empirical studies show that such acquisition costs can be 
surprisingly high, leading to low profits from cross border acquisitions. 
Our model shows that the acquiring firm is always the one that would have gained the highest 
profits if an acquisition was not possible. In fact we find that the equilibrium acquisition price reflects the 
target firm potential for growth. We also find that changes in the market size and technology 
asymmetries affect the choice between cross border acquisition and other entry modes, both directly and 
indirectly via strategy shifts, that is by inducing a change in what would be the equilibrium in the no 
acquisition situation. 
                                                 
26 We have NNNN 21 ππ >   which implies NNGN 21 ππ >  if the status quo is GN.  
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When only one type of asymmetry is considered, we find that if national markets are highly 
protected and thus the alternative to an acquisition is represented by two national monopolies,  market size 
asymmetry alone does not generate an incentive for a cross border acquisition. However, technological 
asymmetry alone may create such incentives.  Furthermore, if we have technological asymmetry but market 
size symmetry, when an acquisition takes place the technological leader is always the acquirer. 
When both types of asymmetries play a role, we find that if the technology leader comes from a large 
country, it will – except for some extreme configurations - be the acquirer if there is any cross border take 
over at all.  In the case of a technology leader based in the small country, the results are more complex. With 
prohibitively high barriers to greenfield FDI (thus with. national monopolies in the non acquisition case), 
under rather general conditions, if there is an acquisition that is made by the laggard based in the large 
country.  Market size asymmetry tends to prevail on technological asymmetry in such scenario, and  a large 
home market emerges as a key factor for determining who will be the acquirer in an international deal.  Only 
if market size asymmetry is rather small, an acquisition made by the technology leader may emerge as the 
optimal entry mode within the segmented markets setting. 
We also show that greenfield FDI liberalisation increases the likelihood of observing an acquisition 
as the equilibrium outcome. In other  words, if the globalization process leads to e.g. lower fixed investment 
costs under greenfield, it does not necessarily mean that we will see more greenfield investment, but rather 
more acquisitions. This prediction seems to fit the developments mentioned in Section 1. As to the identity of 
the acquirer, we find that the effect of multilateral greenfield FDI liberalization depends on the extent of the 
technology gap. If the small country producer enjoys a strong technological lead and is able to exploit it 
internationally, FDI liberalization increases the range of parameters for which such firm may become the 
acquirer. In order to fully benefit from its advantage in the global market, the technology leader should be 
able not only to become an MNE but also to transfer its technology at low costs across borders. However the 
same liberalisation in the FDI regime increases the likelihood that a weak technology leader will become a 
target in a cross border deal.  Thus globalization seems to create the preconditions for world leadership in the 
case of  strong technology leaders based in small countries, but at the same time  it increases   weak leaders’ 
vulnerability to foreign take-over. 
The size of the home market – as expected- emerges as a more crucial factor in international M&As  
when national markets are highly protected, in other words it is more important with segmented markets  
than  in a globalized world. In a liberalized FDI regime instead, a strong technological lead becomes a 
crucial determinant of who will buy whom, if technologies are transferable.  
Our future research will continue analysing the consequences of imposing both technology and 
market size asymmetries. One extension will be to incorporate the financial determinants of M&As, 
capturing different access to the capital market via firm specific parameters. Furthermore, we will investigate 
possible policy implications. Here, it is natural to ask whether governments can find it optimal to block 
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acquisitions in order to avoid the establishment of monopolies, even though acquisitions may improve 
production technology through knowledge transfer.  
 
Appendix 1 
The profit functions of the two firms in selected market configurations  (GN, A1, A2) are: 
 Fqcqqqasqcqqsa IIIIIIIIIII
GN −−−+−−+−−−= ,10,1,2,1,10,1,11 )())()1(()()( τσσπ                                              A.I.1 
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Appendix II 
 
The equilibrium profits for each market configuration in the non-cooperative game with { }GN ,~* =Λ obtained by 
substituting in the profit functions the optimal sales we get by solving the second stage games,  are: 
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Appendix III 
Let us consider the case in which firm 1 makes an offer. Firms bargain over  )( 2
dAV γπ− . The equilibrium bid is 
given by the Nash bargaining solution of the cooperative game. This is point N on the negotiation set (segment 
AD), such that the products of the gains obtained from the agreement (with reference to the threat point d) is 
maximised (see Petit (1990), p. 231). The Nash solution N can also be interpreted as the point on the AD segment  
which yields the largest rectangle for d. Note that dD = dA. Since the triangle AdD is equilateral and symmetric, N 
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has coordinates )
2
1;
2
1( 21 dDdD
dd ++ ππ  where dD= { })()( 212 dddAV ππγπ +−−  represents the overall gain from 
cooperation, that is  the excess profits from the acquisition when firm 1 is the acquirer.   
 
Insert figure A1 
Appendix IV  (s>0.5, σ=0.5) 
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Appendix V  (s=0.5, σ>0.5) 
If )(~* NN=Λ  or )(~* GG=Λ ,  firm 1 (the technology leader) will  have higher profits than firm 2 due to lower unit 
costs. If )(~* GN=Λ  equilibrium profits are given by: 
F
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τσσπ −−+−= caGN                                                                                                                 A.V.2 
from which we have GNGN 21 ˆˆ ππ >  (given that GNIIGNI ,2,1 ˆˆ ππ >  and 09
))1(25.0( 20 >−−−+− Fca στσ  necessary for 
GN to be the status quo). 
 
Appendix VI  (s<0.5, σ>0.5) 
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44
))1()1((ˆ
22
0
2
BcasNN =−+−−= σπ                                                                                                     A.VI.2 
Since 0>A  and 0>B ,   22 AB >  requires AB > ,  from which NNNN 12 ˆˆ ππ >  iff  
)1()1( σσ −−>−− asas  
Let us consider  33.0=s  (lower bound of the large market size asymmetry) and 99.0=σ (upper bound 
of the technological asymmetry). The model require that 00 >− csa  which implies 0303.3>a . It follows  
that )1()1( σσ −−>−− asas is verified  and that NNNN 12 ˆˆ ππ >  for all admissible parameters in the case of a large 
market size asymmetry.
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